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Abstract. Can we explain barriers to adaptation of collective action to changes in
the natural environment? One reason for adaptation is the impacts of climate
change. Ample case study evidence shows that such adaptation is rarely a smooth
process. However, generalisable patterns of how and why barriers arise remain
scarce. The study adopts a collective action perspective and the archetypes
approach in a meta-analysis of 26 selected publications to explain how barriers
arise in specific conditions. Focusing on adaptation of water governance in river
basins, the study finds 21 reappearing patterns. Less well-established patterns
relate to water property rights, hydrological standards, adaptation externalities,
non-climatological uncertainty and vertical coordination. Results further show
how barriers impede collective action in specific ways. The paper precisely
introduces the archetypes approach, and shows that reported problems in
adapting collective action under climate change arise from attributes of actors and
pre-existing institutions rather than biophysical characteristics.
1. Introduction
Many river basins worldwide are affected by hydro-meteorological extremes, in
particular floods and droughts. Commonly, various institutional arrangements
are in place to deal with these disturbances through collective action. Climate
change, however, will likely increase the frequency and intensity of heavy rain,
floods and droughts in the coming decades, or has already increased them (IPCC
2013). This raises the question of whether existing water governance institutions
are able to adapt to more frequent or intense extreme events. Evidence from case
studies shows that this cannot be taken for granted (e.g. Milman et al. 2013;
Pulwarty and Maia 2015), i.e. that there are barriers to climate adaptation.
The literature on barriers to climate adaptation has taken stock of what kind
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of barriers arise, but paid less attention to how and why they arise. Stronger
emphasis on explaining the emergence of barriers to adaptation is needed to
better inform strategies of dealing with them (Barnett et al. 2015; Biesbroek
et al. 2013; Eisenack et al. 2014; Moser and Ekstrom 2010). Our paper presents
a comparative institutional analysis of barriers to climate adaptation in river
basins to extend understanding of how adaptation barriers arise. It is based on
a meta-analysis of 26 systematically selected, coded and analysed empirical case
studies.
Adaptation is defined here as individual or collective action that is ultimately
intended to affect exposed units in response to expected or experienced climate
change stimuli (Eisenack and Stecker 2012; Klein and Johula 2014). Barriers are
‘impediments to specified adaptations for specified actors in their given context
that arise from a condition or set of conditions. A barrier can be valued differently
by different actors, and can, in principle, be reduced or overcome’ (Eisenack et al.
2014: 868).
Current debate about the governance of climate adaptation shows that
theoretical explanations for how and why barriers to adaptation emerge, persist
and change over time are underdeveloped (Biesbroek et al. 2013; Eisenack et al.
2014; Huitema et al. 2016). Even though barriers identified so far point to
crucial collective action problems (Bisaro and Hinkel 2016; Oberlack 2017),
this literature is not yet strongly connected to institutional analysis. This is
astonishing as climate change likely modifies interdependencies between actors,
such as those between upstream and downstream water users or between water
service providers, spatial planners and water users (Paavola 2007; Roggero
2015).
The 26 systematically selected publications of worldwide case studies in
our meta-analysis are considerably heterogeneous in terms of river basins,
contexts and reported variables. Such heterogeneity is well known in research
on adaptation to climate change (Klein and Johula 2014). This raises the
question of how to justify explanations of barriers to adaptation without making
meaningless over-abstractions from particularities. Our paper thus aims to
contribute to methodological developments in comparative institutional analysis
by utilising the archetype approach (Eisenack et al. 2006) to analyse recurrent
patterns of adaptation barriers. The results show that 21 recurrent kinds of
collective action problems explain the emergence of barriers.
These archetypes qualify common statements from the literature. While our
paper reconfirms some well-known barriers, it cannot support some of the
‘usual suspects’, and it characterises others that are not so much researched
yet, but invite more institutional analysis, e.g. barriers from specific water
rights allocation, from hydrological standards or from externalities caused by
adaptation actions.
The results provide insights beyond climate adaptation, namely on established
typologies from the institutional theory of common-pool resource governance
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(CPRs). Such typologies consider how biophysical characteristics of the CPR give
rise to collective action problems (Ostrom et al. 1994; called ‘realist-materialist
position’ by Bisaro and Hinkel 2016). A diversity of institutions enables resource
users to solve collective action dilemmas in dealing with their biophysical
environment (Ostrom 2005). What does this imply for the emergent collective
action problems if the biophysical environment (e.g. the climate) changes? Does
the way in which biophysical conditions change (e.g. more frequent floods or
droughts) explain the kind of barriers to adaptation that emerge? Based on the
evidence from the 26 case studies, the results of our paper suggest that problems
in adapting collective action under climate change arise primarily from particular
features of pre-existing institutions and actor attributes.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews climate
change adaptation in river basins from the perspective of CPR theory with
regard to the governance of collective action problems. Section 3 introduces
the archetypes approach with a novel set-theoretic definition. It also describes
the methods and material. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses the
contributions of this paper to CPR theory and adaptation research and section
6 concludes.
2. Collective action and adaptation to climate change in river basins
Because water is an essential good that provides multiple services, and because
water is mobile in space and variable in time, it is costly to organise responses
to water scarcity during droughts or excess water during floods. Users of water
services are typically highly interdependent, for example through upstream–
downstream relations. By interdependence we mean any kind of influence that a
choice or reward of one actor can have on another, be it through institutional or
biophysical links (Paavola 2007). Governance of resource access under climate
change, e.g. through property rights regimes, is hence not straightforward.
In fact, many empirical studies report barriers to adaptation in river basins
and other units exposed to climate change. Scholars have started collecting and
systematising barriers (e.g. Biesbroek et al. 2011; Eisenack et al. 2011; Moser
and Ekstrom 2010). This is important work to build upon, but it offers, up
to now, little explanation ‘of the reasons why adaptation is proceeding more
slowly than the growing urgency of climate change would lead us to expect’
(Eisenack et al. 2014: 870; see also Barnett et al. 2015; Biesbroek et al. 2013).
For adaptation in river basins, existing studies show that climate change typically
affects different water services – such as navigation, drinking water, hydropower
and fishing. Well-established results are the benefits of participatory water
resources management, and the challenges from climate change uncertainty (e.g.
Huntjens et al. 2012, Pahl-Wostl and Knieper 2014).
While there is little institutional analysis of barriers to adaptation, there is
considerable work on water governance (e.g. Garrick et al. 2013; Libecap 2011;
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Ostrom 1990; Saleth and Dinar 2008). Our study aims to go one step further
in deepening the understanding of barriers to adaptation in that direction. The
more general literature on water governance has shown the importance of factors
such as polycentric institutions and cross-scale institutional linkages (Heikkila
et al. 2011; Pahl-Wostl and Knieper 2014; Saleth and Dinar 2008), adaptive
capacity (Milman et al. 2013), water allocation rules (Schlager and Heikkila
2011), devolution (Blomquist et al. 2005), policy learning (Huntjens et al. 2012),
sustained stakeholder participation (Blomquist et al. 2005), clear boundaries
and enforcement (Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2015), human pressure on water use
(Knieper and Pahl-Wostl 2016) and recognition of local narratives and historical
meanings of the rivers (Ching and Mukherjee 2015). These factors increase the
likelihood that governance systems can cope with collective action problems
that would lead to overuse or inequality in governing water in river basins. The
literature cautions against panaceas (Meinzen-Dick 2007) and urges researchers
and policymakers alike to recognise the diversity of contexts (Ostrom et al.
2007).
In terms of collective action problems in natural resource governance,
CPR theory conventionally distinguishes appropriation dilemmas and provision
dilemmas (Ostrom et al. 1994). Appropriation problems describe the social
dilemma structure, which arises from the incentives of individual resource users
to appropriate resource units beyond levels that would be rational from the
collective perspective of a user community. As Ostrom et al. (1994) show, the
precise structure of incentives in appropriation dilemmas varies with biophysical
factors, in particular with the (a)symmetry of appropriation externalities between
resource users, with the nature of technological externalities and with the spatial
distribution of resource units (Janssen and Rollins 2012; Ostrom and Gardner
1993). By contrast, provision dilemmas relate to the free-rider incentives for
resource users when they decide about their contributions to create or maintain
a resource stock, including its physical infrastructure. The precise structure of
provision problems varies with the time-dependence of supply- and demand-side
strategies (Ostrom et al. 1994).
Such typologies of governance problems are essential for institutional
diagnostics, among other reasons (Cox 2011; Ostrom et al. 2007; Young 2002).
A diagnostic approach seeks to match particular features of institutions to the
particular features of governance problems that arise in specific social–ecological
conditions (Cox et al. 2010). An important motivation for advancing diagnostic
methods is to build cumulative knowledge on such matches (Cox 2011;
Ostrom 2009). This literature has put much emphasis on biophysical conditions
(e.g. upstream–downstream relations and infrastructure) to explain what
arrangements for collective action emerge. In an important diagnostic example
for applying CPR theory to climate adaptation, Bisaro and Hinkel (2016: 354)
analyse, based on theoretical arguments, ‘how biophysical conditions give rise
to certain types of social dilemmas’ in adaptation governance. If the biophysical
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conditions change due to global warming, one would expect new or modified
social dilemmas (see Eisenack 2016 for a similar argument). Since adapting
institutional arrangements to modified dilemmas requires, in turn, collective
action, it can thus be expected that the characteristics of biophysical change give
rise to certain types of barriers to adaptation. We will investigate the validity of
this general proposition in our sample of cases.
3. Archetypes and methods
Archetypes approach
Recent literature on climate adaptation shows substantial heterogeneity in the
local or regional cases, where barriers are reported, and in their biophysical,
socio-economic and institutional contexts (Eisenack et al. 2014). This raises
the methodological question of whether and how to systematically identify
generalisable patterns, if general regularities that apply to all cases cannot
be expected. This is a challenge to research on climate adaptation, but is
also well known in other research fields (Ostrom et al. 2007; Petschel-Held
2003; Rittel and Webber 1973; Warren 2002). One strategy would be an
idiographic approach that considers each case as unique. This would avoid
making wrong generalisations, but would also impede the transfer of knowledge
and effective governance strategies between cases. By contrast, a nomothetic
strategy, aiming at generally applicable explanations for all cases, would likely
lead to over-generalisations and ineffective policy panaceas if contexts are highly
heterogeneous (Frey and Cox 2015).
We thus employ an approach in between these two extremes to identify
reappearing patterns, called archetypes (Eisenack et al. 2006, Oberlack and
Eisenack 2014; UNEP 2007). Archetypes are recurrent patterns of basic
interactions in social–ecological systems. They are building blocks of social–
ecological interaction that reappear in multiple cases. Archetypes are described
as building blocks because it is not required that every case can be completely
described by a single archetype. One archetype hence covers the universe
of considered cases only partially. For a comprehensive picture of a single
case it might be necessary to combine several archetypes and their case-
specific particularities, i.e. the specific values and meaning of abstract variables.
Archetypes are described abstractly enough to cover relevant properties of
multiple cases, but should not be so abstract so that they apply to every case –
which would make them meaningless (Eisenack 2012; Oberlack et al. 2016).
To illustrate this with a simple example, consider constrained public budgets.
While they are a frequently reported barrier to adaptation, constrained budgets
are not always the primary problem – obviously, they are not present in all cases.
In other cases, constrained budgets might occur in different combinations with
other features, such as externalities that lead to inefficient spending, or limited
governmental incentives to provide sufficient budgets.
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There are several related approaches: (1) The diagnostic approach to
human–environment interactions and social–ecological systems starts from
the assumption that there are no general institutional fixes to all kinds of
environmental problems (Ostrom et al. 2007; Young 2002). (2) The syndrome
approach to global change was inspired by a medical metaphor, too (Lu¨deke
et al. 2004; WBGU 1994). Each of the 16 identified syndromes represents
a specific functional pattern of abstract factors that is more or less relevant
under different conditions. The factors allow for both comparison between
cases and for case-specific concretisation. Multiple syndromes can occur in
the same case. The institutional dimension is strongly under-represented in
this approach. (3) Similarly, the vulnerability of human–environment systems
to environmental and socio-economic change has been synthesised along so-
called archetypes of vulnerability (Kok et al. 2016; Sietz et al. 2011; UNEP
2007). Reappearing configurations are decomposed into subsets of mutually
exclusive vulnerability profiles. They describe the specific conditions that create
vulnerability for specific groups of people. Policy suggestions are specific for
each vulnerability profile. (4) The social–ecological systems (SES) framework of
Ostrom (2009) provides a set of variables that empirical research over the past
three decades has shown to matter for sustainability of SESs. Its multi-tiered
structure (i.e. higher-tier variables are sub-classes of lower-tier variables) allows
the researcher to select the level of abstraction most appropriate for a specific
study.
In our paper, we adopt a set-theoretic understanding of archetypes. This
understanding allows for a precise expression of the approach, and lends to
using set-theoretic methods. Alternative expositions are more qualitative (e.g.
Eisenack et al. 2006; Oberlack and Eisenack 2014), or are based on quantitative
indicators (e.g. UNEP 2007; Kok et al. 2016). The universe of analysed cases
is denoted as the case set C. The considered set of attributes is denoted by A.
Putting aside the empirical difficulties in this section, every attribute a  A is
defined in such a way that it can be assessed whether it holds for a specific case c
 C. The complete data are thus a relation K  C × A. A whole set of attributes
A’  A holds for a case c  C, if all attributes a’  A’ hold for c. It is further
useful to distinguish two types of attributes. First, diagnostic attributes D  A
characterise institutional, biophysical, technical and socio-economic conditions
of the cases. They characterise any event, factor or change that characterises the
considered social–ecological system(s) or explains an outcome in a case c. Second,
outcome attributes F  A characterise present or expected conditions that are
to be explained by diagnostic attributes, variables that express a prediction for
a case, or performance indicators for evaluation (depending on the research
question). The present study keeps the outcome attributes F quite simple – there
is only one: the occurrence of a barrier to adaptation. The more challenging task
is to specify a set of diagnostic attributes D that is meaningful in terms both of
theory, and of the cases we study.
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An archetype is defined as a recurrent, specific relation between diagnostic
and outcome attributes of the form:
For all cases c of a subset Ci  C: if a set of the diagnostic attributes Di  D
holds for c, then the outcome attributes Fi  F are expected to hold for c.
The index i of the subsets is needed to allow for multiple archetypes to hold in
one case. An archetype is ‘recurrent’ if it is observed in two or more cases. It is
said that an archetype i covers a case c if c  Ci and the diagnostic attributes
Di and the outcome attributes Fi hold for c. Thus, single cases can be related to
archetypes that cover them, thereby identifying those aspects of individual cases
that are reappearing, while identifying idiosyncratic aspects that make cases
unique.
Not all arbitrary combination of diagnostic and outcome attributes can qualify
as an archetype. We further require them to have a certain feature according
to formal concept analysis (Ganter and Wille 1999) as follows. The set of all
cases in the data that have a single attribute in common is called the attribute’s
extension. The extension of a set of multiple attributes contains the set-theoretic
intersection of all the single attributes’ extensions (i.e. all cases that share
at least all these multiple attributes). The extension is similar to what other
approaches to meta-analysis call the frequency of an attribute combination (e.g.
Sietz and Van Dijk 2015). Symmetrically, the intension of a set of cases is the
intersection of their attributes (i.e. the attributes that are shared by all cases
in the set). An archetype requires a ‘closure’, meaning that the extension of
its attributes, a set of cases, has exactly their intension as shared attributes. A
‘closure’ can be computed with modern algorithms (Ganter and Wille 1999),
and guarantees that an archetype covers a maximum set of cases with joint
attributes, and that it covers a maximum set of attributes that are shared by this
set of cases (see Supplementary Material for a stylised example at https://www.
resource-economics.hu-berlin.de/publiccodebook/at_download/file). If such a set
of archetypical barriers to adaptation is developed, we can identify cases with
similar adaptation challenges.
For example, we might expect that upstream–downstream externalities give
rise to a barrier to adapt water governance to climate change. Externalities are
likely to lead to water use conflicts, as upstream users might have little incentives
to reduce water consumption during droughts. So, let the case set C comprise all
reported statements about barriers, and the set C1  C the statements from cases
where droughts are expected to become more frequent due to climate change.
Then, the diagnostic attribute ‘upstream and downstream users present’ (denoted
by a1) together with the attribute ‘water use conflicts’ (a2) might explain barriers
in some cases. However, this might not generally be sufficient for a barrier.
Some studies may report both the attribute a1 and a barrier, but not a2, due to
‘collective choice arrangements for water distribution’ (diagnostic attribute a3).
Finally, there might be a subset of cases C2  C with droughts playing no role at
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all. Thus, we a have a set of two archetypes in this example. The first is given by
C1, D1={a1, a2}, F={barrier}, the second by C1, D2={a1, a3}, F={barrier}, while
in C2 the explanations of the first archetype are just not applicable. Note that
there might be cases c  C1 where both archetypes hold.
Method: Model-centred meta-analysis
Retrieval and selection of case studies
The primary studies for this meta-analysis (see Rudel 2008) were retrieved
through keyword search in Web of Science (WoS) and Scopus. Using the
keywords ‘(climat∗ change OR global warming) AND (adapt∗ AND river
AND (barrier∗ OR constraint∗ OR limit∗ OR opportunit∗ OR decision-making
OR governance OR capacity))’, we retrieved 628 references in WoS and 573
references in Scopus published since 1990 (last accessed 3 June 2015), yielding
a total of 828 unique publications.
We subsequently excluded those studies that did not meet the following
inclusion criteria, applied first to titles and abstracts (leaving 166 papers), and
then to full texts: Studies must be based on primary data (thus excluding reviews
or conceptual papers), and they must be peer-reviewed. Methodologically, the
research process must be transparent with regard to data sources, conceptual and
theoretical approach. Studies must analyse intentional climate change adaptation
options for water governance in parts of a river basin. Finally, studies must
provide a thorough analysis of collective decision making and barriers that
impede adaptation. This procedure yielded 26 publications thatmeet all inclusion
criteria (see appendix for references, river basins and diagnosed archetypes).
Coding
We went through these publications line by line to identify text segments where
the authors make statements about causal effects found in their primary studies.
We call each such text segment a model. Models are hence the analytical
units in this meta-analysis. To qualify for a model, a text segment must be
based on the authors’ empirical research. We excluded segments that only
report insights from other work (cited in their publications), and segments that
are obviously more speculative or are framed as hypothesis for future work
(frequently in the conclusions sections). The identified text segments typically
have a length of about one paragraph (sometimes down to a sentence, e.g.
‘the length of hydropower concessions (up to 80 years) mean that windows
of opportunity for revision seldom appear’, Hill 2013). Sometimes, models are
not expressed in one connected segment, but distributed over different segments
or make reference to contextual conditions in other parts of the text. In such
cases, these textually separated but logically connected segments were coded
as one model. We coded the texts by using the software MaxQDA. Inter-coder
reliability of codedmodels was achieved in two steps. First, five publications were
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double-coded independently by both authors, with an inter-coder reliability of
62%. Discrepancies were resolved in discussion. Second, each author coded
about one half of the publications. The identified models were then checked
by the other author and removed if both did not agree (76% of the models
remained). In the end, we identified 114 models (range: 1–12 models per
publication).
We started fromOstrom’s (2009) SES framework as the analytical framework
for our codebook. It explains outcomes (O) as a result of interactions (I) in
action situations that are shaped by the attributes of four main components
of social–ecological systems (first-tier variables): attributes of the governance
system (GS), actors (A), resource system (RS) and resource units (RU). An
SES is embedded in broader political, social and economic setting (S) and
related to other ecosystems (ECO). We needed to modify the SES framework
in order to code reported case study evidence adequately. First, we decomposed
the GS-component for adaptation situations according to Oberlack (2017).
Second, for the I-component it proved useful to distinguish five variables
to characterise how barriers impede adaptation decision making. Barriers
can relate to ‘constrained capacity’ (actors have limited action space for
adaptation, Berkhout et al. 2006); ‘insufficient reason’ (insufficient reason to
prioritise adaptation among alternative actions, Bromley 2006; Vatn 2005); ‘high
transaction costs’ of collective action (Williamson 2010); ‘asymmetric control’
of actors over collective outcomes (Ostrom 2005; Schmid 2004); and ‘stalled
social learning’ (regular knowledge exchange and updated information is not
accessible or used (Naess et al. 2005, Pahl-Wostl 2009). Finally, it proved
useful to introduce the category ‘adaptation option (AO)’ to characterise the
main attributes of the adaptation considered in a case, such as the time-scale of
implementing an AO or the externalities associated with an AO.
We coded the models by second- and third-tier attributes of the adjusted SES
framework, using at least one interaction attribute (I) and at least one GS-, A-,
RS-, RU-, AO-, S- or ECO-attribute. In the parlance of section 2, the diagnostic
attributes D take the form of I-, GS-, A-, RS-, RU-, AO-, S- or ECO-attributes,
while the outcome attribute O is the occurrence of an adaptation barrier. The
set C is the list of all models.
A detailed codebook of second-tier (e.g. GS24: property rights; AO3: time
requirement to implement the adaptation option) and third-tier (e.g. GS241a:
secure water property rights with fixed allocations; RS221: floods are climate
change stimuli) attributes was inductively developed and continuously refined
by stepwise coding of case studies. The primary studies were coded by both
authors separately. The initial five studies were double-coded with an inter-coder
reliability of 62%. Subsequently, coded models and proposed modifications
of the codebook were discussed regularly (i.e. after coding 4–5 additional
studies) to ensure consistent coding. In a final round, all models were recoded
using the final codebook, which is available in the Supplementary Material
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(https://www.resource-economics.hu-berlin.de/publiccodebook/at_download/
file). Remaining interpretive differences were resolved through discussions.
Codings of attributes were removed if they were not assigned by both authors
(24%). The obtained data set is a table of 114 models and 95 attributes.
Data analysis
First, we performed a formal concept analysis (FCA) (Ganter and Wille 1999)
with the Concept Explorer software to obtain the archetypes. Alternatively, we
might have used the similar Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin 1987;
Schneider and Wagemann 2012) or purely qualitative approaches. We opted for
FCA because the algorithm can determine automatically the closure property of
archetypes (see above) and can deal flexibly with data gaps.
A configuration of at least two diagnostic attributes that lead to a barrier in a
model qualifies as an archetype, if (1) its extension contains at least three models
from at least two papers, and (2) one of the attributes is an I-attribute. This
ensures that archetypes are based onmultiple cases and sources. Somemodels are
covered by multiple archetypes (when their extensions have pairwise non-empty
intersections), i.e. they are building blocks. If we found configurations of more
than two diagnostic attributes it was sufficient for an archetype to occur in two
models from two papers. This procedure typically yields subtypes. A subtype’s
extension is a strict subset of the more ‘coarse-grained’ archetype defined by
two attributes, and contains models with additional attributes in common. The
requirement of archetypes to reappear led to 12 of 114 models not being covered
by any archetype. These models might be interesting for further investigation,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Second, to obtain more overview, we clustered the archetypes by similarity in
terms of collective action problems, following a parallel strategy. One author
adopted a grounded theory approach and inspected all models individually
drawing on the original texts of the primary studies. This author clustered
them by similarity with regard to the collective action problem through which
their diagnostic attributes generate barriers. The other author inspected the
identified archetypes and clustered them according to common problems. It
turned out be helpful to distinguish operators and receptors of adaptation
(Eisenack and Stecker 2012). Operators are actors who have agency in planning
or implementing adaptation actions. Receptors are human or organisational
actors who are affected by an adaptation action. These include beneficiaries
(Tompkins and Eakin 2012) and other affected actors. Both authors discussed
their individual clustering to achieve inter-subjective agreement. Discussion was
guided by the criteria: (1) theoretical consistency within a collective action
problem and (2) small numbers of problems. The clustering procedure was
performed until both authors converged. One might expect that clustering yields
more abstract ‘super-archetypes’. Note that this is not necessarily the case, since
clusters collect archetypes by theoretical similarity. According to the definition
Archetypal barriers to climate adaptation 537
in this paper, an archetype requires more: shared attributes need to hold for all
models covered by it (see below that this indeed the case for our archetypes, but
not for the clusters).
4. Collective action problems in adapting water governance systems
The results show that adaptation of water governance systems in river basins
to climate change is hampered by a set of archetypical barriers that can
be summarised as coordination gaps, path dependencies, zero-sum games,
uncertainty, competing priorities and tangible constraints. Table 1 shows the
details of the 21 identified archetypes. They cover 89% of the models and all
primary studies. The text below describes each of the collective action problems
by cluster and illustrates them with case examples.
Coordination gaps among interdependent operators
An example for a coordination gap is found in South Saskatchewan River Basin
of western Canada. A multitude of state and non-state water organisations with
partly overlapping mandates and functions combined with limited coordination
devices has led to communication chasms and a need for local communities and
business to deal with a multitude of organisation with unclear responsibilities
(Hurlbert and Diaz 2013).
Coordination gaps among interdependent operators of adaptation are the
most frequently observed collective action problems in our sample. All five
archetypes have two components. First, pre-existing institutional arrangements
scatter responsibilities for water governance among multiple operators, but the
institutionalised mechanisms for their vertical and/or horizontal coordination
are limited or absent. The second necessary component of coordination gaps is
that the considered adaptation actions involve strong interdependency between
operators of the adaptations. This can be due for instance to upstream–
downstream water flows, rivalry for water service consumption or established
institutional hierarchies.
This combination of institutional fragmentation and strong actor
interdependency creates barriers in adaptation governance processes mainly
through high transaction costs. High transaction action costs provide adverse
incentives for operators to plan or implement those adaptation actions for which
they must rely on interagency coordination. The transaction costs can stem, for
instance, from time-consuming negotiations, and lead to the absence of social
interaction on planned adaptation. The difficulty in overcoming coordination
gaps increases with the degree to which actor interests are heterogeneous and
incompatible. Similarly, coordination needs rise if trust among actors is limited,
necessitating the negotiation of more complete contractual arrangements.
An interesting special case is archetype 1.5 in which a potential operator of
adaptation would be willing to adapt, but is hampered from doing so because
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Table 1. Archetypical barriers to adapting water governance systems in river basins to climate change
AT # Description of archetype No. of models No. of studies Codes
Coordination gaps among interdependent operators (32 models)
1.1 High transaction costs due to scattered responsibilities 8 8 I3-GS21
High transaction costs due to scattered responsibilities and heterogenous interests about
water services
2 2 I3-GS21-A22
High transaction costs due to scattered responsibilities and limited horizontal coordination 2 2 I3-GS21-GS42
1.2 High transaction costs due to limited horizontal coordination 7 7 I3-GS42
High transaction costs due to limited horizontal coordination with heterogenous interests
and upstream-downstream externalities
2 2 I3-GS42-A22-RS12
1.3 High transaction costs due to limited vertical coordination 3 3 I3-GS41
Insufficient reason due to limited vertical coordination 3 3 I1-GS41
1.4 High transaction costs due to limited trust 6 6 I3-A25
High transaction costs due to limited trust and concurrent stimuli 2 2 I3-A25-RS5
1.5 Limited control of operator due to limited control in polycentric system 4 4 I4-GS31
Path dependencies (25 models)
2.1 High transaction costs due to secure property rights with fixed allocations 5 3 I3-GS241a
2.2 Stalled social learning due to rules based on historical hydrology 5 4 I5-GS234b
Stalled social learning due to rules based on historical hydrology and limited understanding
of climatic stimulus
3 2 I5-GS234b-A13
Stalled social learning (lagged information uptake) due to rules based on historical
hydrology and limited understanding of climatic stimulus and of SES
2 2 I5-GS234b-A13-A12
Limited understanding of climatic stimulus and rules based on historical hydrology 4 3 A13-GS234b
2.3 Stalled social learning due to slow procedures for institutional change 3 3 I5-GS91
2.4 Insufficient reason due to path dependency in agency 3 3 I1-A16
High transaction costs due to path dependency in agency 3 3 I3-A16
Zero-sum games (24 models)
3.1 High transaction costs due to heterogenous interests about water services 14 9 I3-A22
Insufficient reason due to heterogenous interests about water services 6 5 I1-A22
Insufficient reason due to heterogenous interests about water services and high costs of
adaptation
2 2 I1-A22-AO4
3.2 High transaction costs due to externalities of the adaptation option 5 5 I3-AO1
A
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Table 1. (Continued)
AT # Description of archetype No. of models No. of studies Codes
High transaction costs (costs of conflict) due to adaptation externality and
top-down-decision-making
2 2 I3-AO1-GS44
High transaction costs due to adaptation externality and uncertain consequences of the
adaptation option
2 2 I3-AO1-AO2
Co-occurrence of heterogenous interests about water services and adaptation externality 4 4 A22-AO1
Uncertainty (21 models)
4.1 Constrained capacity due to limited understanding of SES 5 4 I2-A12
High transaction costs due to limited understanding of SES 5 4 I3-A12
Stalled social learning due to limited understanding of SES 4 4 I5-A12
4.2 Constrained capacity due to limited understanding of climatic stimulus 4 3 I2-A13
Insufficient reason due to limited understanding of climatic stimulus 3 3 I1-A13
Co-occurrence of limited understanding of SES and of climatic stimulus 3 3 A12-A13
Competing priorities (20 models)
5.1 Insufficient reason due to incompatible institutional incentives 6 4 I1-GS23
5.2 Insufficient reason due to concurrent stimuli 4 3 I1-RS5
5.3 Insufficient reason due to limited awareness of climate change 5 4 I1-A111
5.4 Insufficient reason due to perception of climate change as a future problem 3 3 I1-A15
5.5 Insufficient reason due to heterogeneous interests about priority of adaptation 5 3 I1-A23
Tangible constraints (19 models)
6.1 Constrained capacity due to financial constraints 9 8 I2-A31
Constrained capacity due to financial constraints in the presence of an existing adaptation
deficits
2 2 I2-A31-RS6
Constrained capacity due to financial constraints and poor coordination of data 2 2 I2-A31-GS421
Constrained capacity and high transaction costs due to financial constraints 3 2 I2-I3-A31
Co-occurrence of financial constraints and limited understanding of SES 3 2 A31-A12
6.2 Constrained capacity due to limited information 4 4 I2-A41
6.3 Constrained capacity due to staff constraints 4 3 I2-A51
Note. Frequency counts have no meaning in terms of significance in our methodology, and one model can contain one or more archetypes. The table contains
one row per archetype, sorted by the collective action problems, each described in more detail in this section. For each archetype (with a two-digit number in the
left-hand column) a short description is provided based on the codes that define it. Subtypes of archetypes are presented in separate rows, and do not carry an
individual number.
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control over decision making is located elsewhere in a polycentric system. For
instance, Farley et al. (2011) show how a municipal department in Oregon, USA,
was willing to adapt water quality standards to new climatic conditions, but was
constrained by the state-level regulatory framework, without an effective option
for intervening at this higher level.
Path dependency in climate change adaptation
Attention to the role of path dependency in climate adaptation is increasing
(Barnett et al. 2015). Path dependency describes situations in which institutions,
infrastructures or practices that have been established in the past constrain
opportunity sets, shape beliefs or preferences in current decisionmaking (Garrelts
and Lange 2011).
We find four archetypes. First, secure water rights with a fixed quantity of
water withdrawal have impeded climate adaptation. In arid areas that have been
colonised in the past such as in Australia and the Western US, it was crucial
to incentivise the construction of new irrigation systems. This sometimes led
to the right of prior appropriators to obtain as much water as required, with
only the remainder becoming available for downstream users. If water becomes
scarcer under changing climatic conditions, secure water rights that allow fixed
amounts of water withdrawal disincentivise economic water use by rights holders
and constrain AOs by non-rights holders from dealing with droughts (Schlager
and Heikkila 2011). Removing this barrier to adaptation is not straightforward
under the rule of law, which protects property rights. In the presence of secure
water rights with fixed water withdrawal, barriers arise as problems of high
transaction costs, such as lengthy negotiations, as well as the unproductive effects
of organised resistance and rent seeking (cf. Eisenack 2016).
Second, reliance on historical hydrological records is a typical feature of
modern water management institutions. There tend to be formalised rules on
how data is retrieved and processed, and what statistical models are used for
decisionmaking. Important examples are historic runoff data, flooding frequency
and data about the hydrological cycle. There are different plausible reasons for
such standardised data from an institutional perspective. Hydrological data help
to make efficient decisions in complex SESs, such as river basins. Standardisation
and provision of hydrological data can help resolving information asymmetries
between actors (e.g. upstream and downstream). It might also help in procedures
for resolving conflict. However, if the climate is continuously changing over
the next decades and centuries, procedures based on hydrological data might
become systematically outdated. Established statistical procedures typically use
the hydrological record of up to centuries into the past and are based on the
assumption that – although river runoff might be highly variable – its statistics
(frequency distribution etc.) are stationary. Thus, these statistical procedures
might be inappropriate, and even if they are equipped to deal with non-stationary
processes, the statistically robust empirical evidence always lags behind.
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Third, slow procedures for institutional change induce path dependency that is
relevant to adaptation. Examples include termination dates for water treaties that
lie in the far future (Cosens andWilliams 2012) or time-consuming procedures of
institutional change that involve amultitude of stakeholders and decision-makers
in multi-level systems (Farley et al. 2011).
Fourth, established practices of operators and receptors of adaptations,
for example long-term appropriation practices of water users, individual
complacency and habits of organisational culture, create persistence with regard
to behavioural change (Hurlbert and Montana 2015; Kirchhoff et al. 2013).
To sum up these archetypes, path dependency creates barriers because it is
generally difficult to change existing institutions, although that might be required
because of changing climatic conditions. In our case, change is required in terms
of water property rights, hydrological standards, water contracts and habits.
Difficulties particularly stem from renegotiating existing arrangements in light
of vested interests and transaction costs, or from stalled social learning.
Archetypes related to path dependencies sometimes occur together with those
related to uncertainty (e.g. Pulwarty and Melis 2001). First, actors that exercise
standardised statistical procedures are not always perfectly informed about
the specific character of the river basin that needs to be managed (4.1: see
Table 1). Thus, updating extreme event statistics becomes more difficult. Second,
uncertainty about the future stimuli of climate change (4.2) hinders adaptations.
It might seem to be one straightforward policy option for the data standardisation
based on the historical hydrology to be extended by hydrological simulations for
climatic conditions that are different from the past. This, however, requires
reliable and uncontested climatic projections. These tend to be unavailable from
scientific studies.
Zero-sum games
In zero-sum games, the considered AOs do not allow for Pareto improvements
for operators and/or receptors, so that actors are caught in struggles about water
services and AOs. In our sample, zero-sum games arise in the presence of two
archetypes.
The first archetype are heterogeneous interests of actors about different
water services such as freshwater, cooling water, hydro-electricity, navigation,
fishing, recreation (3.1). For example, in the Southern Saskatchewan River basin,
Canada, divergent interests in water uses for irrigation, industrial purposes,
domestic uses and environmental conservation nurtured political stalemates
about water management in the face of intensifying droughts (Hurlbert et al.
2009).
Second, negative externalities can be created through an AO (3.2). For
example, the planned introduction of water metering was perceived as eroding
water rights by agricultural water users in Okanagan, Canada, thus fuelling their
opposition (Shepherd et al. 2006).
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In most instances of zero-sum games, barriers arise as problems of high
transaction costs. These take the form of organised resistance of water users to
AOs, investments in rent-seeking contests or time-consuming conflict resolution
processes. If actors mutually invest in wasteful or even destructive conflict
activities to win political struggles, zero-sum games of climate change adaptation
can transform into downward spirals and lose–lose games. Furthermore, zero-
sum games frequently interact with other collective action problems. For
example, path dependency can co-occur with zero-sum games, as Hamlet (2011)
documents for the Columbia River Basin in the US’s and Canada’s Pacific
Northwest, which proposed changes to historical water allocations triggered
contentious struggles about water property rights.
Uncertainty
Although sophisticated scientific climate projections for the next decades and
centuries mostly agree on the rough trends of global warming, there is substantial
uncertainty about the precise speed of change, about its local manifestation,
and about other meteorological variables like precipitation (IPCC 2013). These
uncertainties are not simply limitations of current scientific knowledge. They also
stem from biophysical processes that are fundamentally difficult to forecast, and
fromdifficulties in predicting human behaviour and socio-economic development
over decades. This can lead to an insufficient base for informed decisions.
Moreover, uncertainties can also be well employed as an excuse for inaction
(Hallegatte 2009).
Interestingly, we can distinguish between two archetypes: uncertainty about
climate change (4.2) and uncertainty about the social–ecological system (4.1).
The common argument about uncertain climate change only applies to 4.2, but
we find 4.1 more frequently (e.g. with lagged information uptake, Pulwarty and
Melis 2001, limited informational means to adapt, Farley et al. 2011, or high
costs of coordination, Wilder et al. 2010). River basins tend to be inherently
complex, so limited knowledge did already arise with a historic and stable
climate, and now tends to amplify the problems. This effect has also been
observed for adaptation of transport infrastructure (Rotter et al. 2016). In terms
of effects on decisionmaking, uncertainty is associatedwith constrained capacity,
insufficient reason, high transaction costs and stalled social learning.
Competing priorities
In archetypes with competing priorities, the potential operator of an adaptation
prioritises objectives other than climate change adaptation, due to concurrent
stimuli to the resource system assessed as more urgent than climate change,
or due to preferences that are detrimental to the considered AO. Five distinct
archetypes are identified that are associated with competing priorities.
First, the operator may face institutional incentives that are incompatible
with specific adaptations (5.1). For example, Farley et al. (2011) show for
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water governance along the McKenzie River, USA, that priority to flood control
institutionalised in the statute of the water managing agency gave the agency
insufficient reason to impacts of flood adaptation for downstream water uses
for recreation, fish and wildlife. Second, climate change is rarely the single
stimulus to resource systems that water governance needs to adapt to (5.2). These
competing priorities for governing water systems include, for instance, increasing
water demand resulting from industrial development, the expansion of mining,
agriculture and dryland irrigation, tourism and residential development. Third,
studies recurrently attributed the prioritisation of non-adaptation objectives to
limited awareness of climate change and its local impacts (5.3), as well as to
perception of climate change as a problem for future generations (5.4). Finally,
competing interests among multiple actors about the priority of adaptation in
a river basin can create barriers, for instance through long-term versus short-
term political interests associated with adaptation plans. In the presence of
competing priorities, adaptation barriers arise as instances of insufficient reasons
of potential operators for climate adaptation. Potential operators under-prioritise
adaptations for the benefit of other objectives.
Tangible constraints
Three archetypical tangible constraints are recurrently identified in our sample:
financial constraints (6.1), limited information (6.2), and staff constraints (6.3).
Adaptation barriers arise as instances of limited action space that potential
operators of adaptation have to plan or implement adaptations. Tangible
constraints are often cited as a proximate source of barriers, and they can have
underlying collective action problems, for instance if competing priorities or path
dependencies constrain the resources available to an operator.
5. Discussion
Explaining barriers to climate change adaptation
Even though the specific manifestations of adaptation barriers in particular cases
are heterogeneous, the results have shown that there is a suite of 21 reappearing
configurations of attributes. These archetypes give rise to collective action
problems generating barriers in decision making for adaptation to changing
climatic conditions. It is important to note that this analysis does not take a
normative position. Diagnosing one of the barriers does not necessarily imply
that it must be resolved. Actors might wish to uphold specific barriers, e.g. to
prevent other barriers from popping up such as rent-seeking contests. Instead,
the results explain the emergence of adaptation barriers by analysing how each of
them is activated by specific factors and specific implications in decision-making
processes.
Some barriers are not yet commonly identified in the adaptation literature,
while other barriers are well known from other contexts and reconfirmed
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in this meta-analysis (e.g. fragmentation of responsibilities). Examples of the
former include the barriers due to non-climatological uncertainty about river
basins (4.1), as opposed to the commonly noted uncertainty about climate
change (e.g. Biesbroek et al. 2011). The common emphasis on climatological
uncertainty might be driven by the strong role of climate projections in
adaptation policies that do not yet manifest so frequently in the models for
barriers in adaptation governance. If decision-makers have to act based on a
limited understanding of social–ecological interactions in the system of concern,
the provision of downscaled climate projections might not overcome uncertainty-
related adaptation barriers. A second, less commonly revealed source of barriers
are externalities of AOs that can fuel resistance, power struggles and reinforced
inequalities (3.2). While ‘fair adaptation’ may help overcome barriers associated
to externalities, this notion has predominantly been applied to fairness at global
scales (e.g. Grasso 2010; Paavola et al. 2006). Future research could analyse the
opportunities of ‘fair adaptation’ to overcome externalities-related barriers in
local and national adaptation decisionmaking. Another less commonly identified
archetypal barrier relates to vertical coordination gaps (1.3) in contrast to more
frequently found horizontal coordination gaps (1.1, 1.2). The former contrasts a
frequent and normative pro-participation and pro-polycentricity conception (e.g.
Gupta et al. 2010; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2012) and invites deeper research about the
comparative importance of horizontal and vertical coordination in adaptation
governance.
Other ‘usual suspects’ of commonly reported barriers do not recur in
our sample. Examples include the short-termism of public decision making
(Heinrichs et al. 2011), missing participation (Biesbroek et al. 2011), linguistic
differences between local perspectives and transnational climate change science
(Betzold 2015), and insecure land tenure of vulnerable groups (Oberlack and
Eisenack 2014). Further interesting archetypical barriers are discussed below in
section 5.3.
Methodology
Any meta-analysis faces limitations, for example potential biases in selecting
primary studies. Here, we included scientific literature in English retrieved
through keyword-based searches in established databases, Including other
languages, databases and grey literature could have expanded the number of
primary studies. This could have yielded additional empirical support for the
identified archetypes or additional archetypes. However, many reports in the grey
literature provide little information about their research methods, theoretical
and conceptual foundations and data sources, so they would have been excluded
based on the methodological criteria.
Meta-analyses are sometimes criticised for not providing insights on effects
that had not been observed before. Inherently, meta-analyses synthesise existing
knowledge rather than exploring untested hypotheses. They hence provide a
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bigger picture of the considered phenomenon than the underlying primary
studies. They help to identify idiosyncrasy within this bigger picture, and they
identify regularities across cases.
Every identified archetype has received empirical support in multiple models
and primary studies. This study could not code counterfactuals of the diagnostic
attributes because of limited reporting in the primary studies. This is partly due to
specific research questions and the analytical focus of the primary studies. It is not
the objective to infer causal statements from a sample, but to classify reappearing
causal effects identified in the primary studies. They present a synthesis of the
positively reported models. The primary studies establish such causal claims
for specific cases by methods such as process tracing, comparative analyses,
interviews and focus groups that elicit contextualised explanations of adaptation
barriers (Meyfroidt 2016). The archetypes can be further tested and refined by
searching for, and analysing, cases in which a barrier is not experienced, even
though the configuration of diagnostic attributesDi of an archetype i holds. This
counterfactual analysis could provide additional support for, or refine, the causal
claims of the archetypes.
The institutional economics of climate change adaptation
The study of climate change adaptation provides a valuable opportunity for
scholars to advance CPR theory with regard to how collective action is (not)
adapted under changing biophysical conditions (Agrawal 2014). CPR theory
shows that dilemmas vary with different biophysical conditions (Janssen and
Rollins 2012; Ostrom et al. 1994). By contrast, the results of this paper show
that most of the empirically identified barriers to climate adaptation arise out
of specific features of institutional history (e.g. fragmented responsibilities or
secure property rights in established institutions) and actor attributes (e.g. limited
understanding of social–ecological systems) rather than biophysical conditions.
This insight needs systematic validation in future empirical research. Although
it might be a bias in most authors’ contributions synthesised in this meta-
study, or in ourselves, there might also be stronger reasons behind it. The
primary case studies show that adaptation processes proceed against a historical
context of established institutions and socio-political and economic relations.
For instance, established property rights constrain AOs by non-rights holders to
deal with droughts (Schlager and Heikkila 2011). Further, adapting institutional
arrangements might be seen as collective action of a higher order, which is
fundamentally different from collective action that deals directly with a problem
structure stemming from biophysical conditions (Ostrom 2005). This difference
becomes more visible in our study, since we focus on non-static conditions.
While some archetypes are quite straightforward from an economic
perspective, others call for more research from an institutional angle. Problems
of missing incentives (or insufficient reason) reflect only partly the diversity of
encountered adaptation barriers. An interesting example is the trade-off between
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the institutional adaptability and institutional stability of hydrological standards
required for planning, accountability and compliance (2.2). Standardisation
procedures play an important role in light of uncertainty. They are important
for dealing with asymmetric information and legitimising collective decisions.
On the other hand, they can create a detrimental path dependency if conditions
change. Further important questions are raised by secure property rights with
fixed allocations under changing hydrological conditions (2.1). Building on
institutional analysis on this matter (e.g. Schlager and Heikkila 2011), the policy
question needs attention: how can property rights arrangements be adapted to
new climatic conditions in light of existing claims and vested interests?
Taken together, CPR theory is advancing our ability to diagnose the precise
structure of adaptation barriers. This ongoing process requires expanded
research to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding how configurations of
biophysical, institutional, socio-political and economic attributes create specific
collective action barriers to climate adaptation, and how particular opportunities
enable actors to prevent, alleviate or overcome particular barriers in particular
contexts.
6. Conclusions
This paper has analysed 26 systematically selected and coded empirical
publications of adapting water governance in river basins to climate change.
Despite the huge heterogeneity of cases, the meta-analysis identifies recurrent
barriers to adaptation. Each archetype is activated by specific diagnostic
attributes, as shown in section 4. In particular, these findings underpin the
need to give strong consideration to the crucial difficulties with water property
rights, hydrological standards, externalities caused by AOs, non-climatological
uncertainty and lack of vertical coordination. Generally, the catalogue of
archetypes contributes to the urgently needed literature on explaining barriers
to adaptation more thoroughly, here from a comparative institutional analysis
perspective.
We propose archetypes as a methodological approach to advance the study
of institutional diversity, and the paper illustrates its scope for comparative
studies that have to deal with substantial case heterogeneity. The approach seems
well suited to develop middle-range theories of institutional diversity (Merton
[1949] 1968; Ostrom 2005), because it allows us to identify and explain different
patterns for different subsets of cases. Table 1 shows how different institutional
features give rise to different barriers to adapting collective action in the face
of climate change. We thus think that the archetype approach adds a promising
tool to the portfolio of comparative institutional analysis. The approach can be
applied to identify theoretical building blocks from larger case study collections
(e.g. Cox 2014; Hinkel et al. 2015) in a rigorous way. The focus on coding
models rather than cases makes it easier to deal with variables that are not
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jointly reported in a case study sample. As a further innovation, archetypes
accept partial theories that can be combined as building blocks to diagnose
single cases. Both make the approach suitable for dealing with considerable case
heterogeneity.
The analysis contributes to a diagnostic approach to institutional analysis that
seeks to explain collective action arrangements, in particular from biophysical
conditions (Cox 2011; Ostrom et al. 2007; Young 2002). Important steps
towards institutional diagnostics for the governance of CPRs have been made
by organising the multitude of relevant variables into multi-tiered frameworks,
such as the SES framework (Ostrom 2009), that balance biophysical and socio-
economic explananda. Our results show that a prevalent focus on biophysical
attributes alone may overlook the importance of pre-existing institutions and
socio-political relations in explaining collective action in dynamic biophysical
environments.
Future research on institutional change might take climate change impacts on
water governance as a particularly relevant study context. Dynamic exogenous
conditions might challenge the stability of property rights, and the legitimacy
of standards for collective decision making under uncertainty might erode.
Future research on barriers to adaptation can start from the proposed list of
archetypes to test and refine it in focused empirical studies. By extending the
outcome attributes to opportunities for adaptation, a crucial next step is to
match governance strategies to specific archetypical barriers to analyse how they
may prevent, alleviate or overcome barriers in different contexts.
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Appendix
Table A1: Primary studies, regions, river basins and archetypes
Article Countries River basins Archetypes
Binder 2006 USA Watersheds in Washington State 1.4; 2.4; 3.1; 4.2; 6.1; 6.2
Boer 2010 Australia Catchments in northeast Queensland 1.5; 2.1; 2.2; 3.1; 3.2; 5.2
Cosens and Williams 2012 Canada, USA Columbia River 1.1; 4.2
Cots et al. 2009 Portugal, Spain Guadiana River 5.4; 5.5
Engle and Lemos 2010 Brazil 18 river basins (4 in-depth) 1.3; 3.1; 5.5
Farley et al. 2011 USA McKenzie River 1.1; 1.5; 3.1; 3.2; 4.1; 4.2; 5.1; 5.5
Gillon et al. 2015 USA Yahara River 2.2; 2.3; 4.1; 4.2
Hamlet 2011 USA Columbia River 1.1; 1.2; 2.2; 2.4; 3.1; 3.2; 4.1; 6.2; 6.3
Hill 2013 Chile, Switzerland Aconcagua (Chile), Rhone (CH) 1.3; 1.4; 1.5; 5.3; 5.4; 6.2
Hill-Clarvis and Allan 2014 Chile Aconcagua 1.4; 2.1; 2.2; 4.1; 6.1
Hurlbert and Diaz 2013 Canada, Chile Southern Saskatchewan (Canada), Elqui (Chile) 1.1; 1.5; 3.1; 4.2; 5.1; 6.1; 6.2; 6.3
Hurlbert and Montana 2015 Argentina, Canada Mendoza (Argentina), Oldman River (Canada) 1.1; 1.2; 1.3; 2.4; 5.3; 6.1
Hurlbert et al. 2009 Canada Southern Saskatchewan 1.1; 3.1; 5.5
Kirchhoff et al. 2013 Brazil, USA Jaguaribe-Banabuiu Basin, Itajai Basin (Brazil),
watersheds in Arizona and Georgia (USA)
1.1; 1.2; 1.4; 2.3; 2.4; 5.1; 5.2; 5.3; 6.1
Kistin and Ashton 2008 Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia, South Africa
Orange-Senqu River 1.2
Krysanova et al. 2010 Multiple Elbe, Guadiana, Rhine, Nile, Orange,
Amudarya
1.2; 1.4; 3.1; 4.1; 4.2; 5.2; 5.4; 6.1
Larsen 2011 Denmark Multiple rivers 4.2; 5.5
O’Connor et al.1999 USA Susquehanna River 5.3
Pittock and Finlayson 2013 Australia Murray-Darling Basin 2.4; 3.2
Pulwarty and Maia 2015 Mexico, Portugal, Spain,
USA
Colorado River (Mexico/USA), Guadiana
(Portugal/Spain)
1.2; 2.3; 3.1; 3.2
Pulwarty and Melis 2001 Mexico, USA Colorado River 2.2; 4.1; 4.2
Shepherd et al. 2006 Canada Okanagan 1.3; 1.4; 2.1; 3.2
Singh-Peterson et al. 2013 Australia Tweed River 1.1; 3.1
Wei et al. 2011 Australia Murray-Darling 3.1; 4.1; 5.1
Welsh et al. 2013 USA Bear river basin 5.3
Wilder et al. 2010 Mexico, USA Arizona-Sonora region 1.2; 3.1; 4.1; 6.1; 6.3
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